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The European Parliament: One Parliament, Several Modes 
of Political Representation? 
 
Europe has possessed an elected, representative institution for almost thirty years. 
There are several reasons why this can be considered important. For some, the 
existence of the European Parliament (EP) has been a powerful symbol of a continent 
turning away from its past divisions and conflicts.1 For many others, the EP is also of 
practical interest, as a fascinating – if far from wholly successful – experiment in 
multi-national representative politics. For a significant number of scholars, however, 
the EP is important at least in part because it offers a fascinating research site for the 
investigation of important issues in the study of political representation. This is 
certainly the case for those concerned with understanding how electoral institutions 
shape political representation. For this burgeoning, though still in some important 
respects under-developed field of research, Europe’s elected parliament presents the 
opportunity to craft powerful research designs incorporating an unusual, indeed 
probably unique, degree of controlled comparison: between members of the same 
political institution chosen under a range of very different electoral arrangements. 
 This is the starting point for our paper, which seeks to exploit the potential of 
the EP to help us understand more about how the institution’s individuals are elected 
shapes the way in which they interpret and carry out their role as representatives. We 
do so by drawing on data gathered in a 2006 survey of Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs). The paper follows the following format. First, we discuss the 
dependent variable in our analysis, political representation, and explain our particular 
                                               
1
  In his acceptance speech for winning the 1998 Nobel Peace Prize, the Northern Irish 
politician John Hume observed that: 
On my first visit to Strasbourg in 1979 as a Member of the European 
Parliament, I went for a walk across the bridge from Strasbourg to Kehl. 
Strasbourg is in France. Kehl is in Germany. They are very close. I stopped in 
the middle of the bridge and I meditated… If I had stood on this bridge 30 
years before at the end of the Second World War when 25 million people lay 
dead across our continent and if I had said: ‘Don’t worry. In 30 years time we 
will all be together in a new Europe, our conflicts and wars will be ended and 
we will be working together in our common parliament’, I would have been 
sent to a psychiatrist. But it has happened, and it is now clear that the 
European Union is the best example in the history of the world of conflict 
resolution (Oslo, 10th December 1998). 
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focus on the attitudes and behaviour of those elected towards the representation of a 
‘constituency’. Second, we then discuss how electoral systems might be categorised in 
relation to their possible impact on representatives’ attitudes and behaviours. We then 
elaborate a classification of the electoral systems used for EP elections. Finally, we 
examine some of the evidence available on the extent to which the variation in these 
systems is linked to differences in what representatives think and what they do. 
 
Representation and representatives 
Representation is one of the most central, fundamental, and important of 
political concepts. It is not, however, one of the simplest. Indeed, given that to 
represent, or to‘re-present’ means to make present (in some sense) that which is (in 
some other, perhaps more literal sense) not present, one could well say that to speak 
of representation is to enter the realm of the paradoxical. At the very least, the 
implication of some of the most outstanding scholarly studies of the concept has been 
to affirm its complexity (for examples, see Mainsbridge 2003; Pitkin 1967, 1969). 
Representation can legitimately be conceptualised in a range of different ways and 
studied from a number of alternative angles; practices of representation can 
reasonably be evaluated according to varying criteria. 
This paper does not attempt to resolve, or even to discuss, many of the issues 
that animate much of the broader literature on representation. We set our parameters 
much more narrowly. We are concerned here with the role that electoral institutions 
may play in shaping some important aspects of political representation. The following 
section will outline our understanding of electoral systems, and how the differences in 
them may most effectively be categorised. First, however, we wish to define the 
dependent variable of our analysis. What is it about political representation that we 
are concerned with investigating? 
The defining feature of representative democracy, as a genus of political 
system, is that the votes of (much of) the populace determine the membership of key 
political institutions. Such institutions can include those held by single individuals – 
typically an elected Presidency – as well as the multi-member representative 
parliaments that are a ubiquitous part of representative democracies. A necessary 
feature of such democracies is their electoral systems, or the means by which votes 
 4 
are translated into seats in the process of electing politicians into office. These 
systems shape representation by influencing the numbers of seats won by various 
parties. 
But political representation is about far more than just the partisan balance of a 
legislature. And electoral systems affect the representative process not only via their 
direct impact on the partisan outcome of elections. Previous research has shown that 
electoral systems not only affect which parties are represented, and in what 
proportions, but also whom is elected on behalf of these parties.2 The basic rule is that 
more proportional voting systems generate parliaments that are more descriptively 
representative of a society: as well as being more closely aligned to the partisan 
preferences of the people, these parliaments are more similar in terms of objective 
social characteristics, and also in relation to measurable political attitudes (e.g. Huber 
and Powell 1994; Lijphart 1999; Powell 2000). The relationship is not an inevitable 
one: it is certainly possible to have non-proportional electoral systems that produce a 
legislature scoring highly on descriptive representation, while the use of an electoral 
system that guarantees a high degree of partisan proportionality does not necessitate 
that women and minorities will be present in the parliament. Nonetheless, the 
relationship is an empirically strong and consistent one. In return, however, non-
proportional systems have been argued to have other merits: producing strong and 
stable one-party governments (and thus, it is often suggested, leading to better policy-
making); and making it more difficult for extreme parties to win political 
representation. The provenance of some of these latter claims can be disputed. While 
PR systems do produce somewhat greater government instability on average they 
appear, if anything, associated with somewhat better policy outcomes (Lijphart 1999; 
Powell 2000). And some important recent work refutes the widely assumed link 
between PR and the electoral success of extreme right-wing parties (Carter 2005; 
although see Norris 2005).  
But it has long been accepted that representation is about more than simply a 
‘match’ between people and politicians (or the policies that politicians pursue); it is an 
                                               
2
  It is worth noting in passing that the issue of whom is elected can also involve 
questions over whether the ‘correct’ candidate (the Condorcet winner) is 
actually the one elected (e.g. Saari 2001). 
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on-going, dynamic process (Pitkin 1967). And to understand important aspects of this 
process, we need to move from a macro perspective on institutions and aggregate 
outcomes towards a more micro-level analysis of individuals. We need to consider 
how those elected interpret and seek to carry out their role as representatives. Much 
work in this vein has explored the policy responsiveness of individual representatives: 
the extent to which they view their role as being to act as ‘delegates’, in place to 
loyally represent the (perceived) views of the represented, or as ‘trustees’ with a 
mandate to pursue their own vision of the best interests of those whom they represent 
– even to the extent of directly opposing the immediate views of the majority of such 
people (e.g. Wahlke et al 1962). And an increasing body of comparative work, 
following the lead of Fenno’s (1978) study of U.S. Congressional ‘Home Styles’, and 
David Mayhew’s (1974) ideas on the ‘electoral connection’, has investigated whether 
electoral systems that appear to create electoral incentives for representatives to try to 
garner a ‘personal vote’ within a particular geographical constituency will indeed 
prompt behaviour consistent with those incentives (Ames 1995; Bowler and Farrell 
1993; Cox 1990; Shugart 2001). Nonetheless, the evidence for this is limited in scope 
and fragmentary in nature. The weakness of work in this area is attributable in large 
part to problems of research design. In most single-country studies, the electoral 
system is a constant, not a variable. And comparative studies usually have great 
difficulties distinguishing electoral system effects from other institutional influences 
(such as how the organization of particular parliaments shapes representatives’ 
attitudes and behaviour) and from broader cultural differences in how the 
representative relationship is defined. Moreover, in the relatively few cases where a 
major electoral reform has been experienced (such as New Zealand in the 1990s), 
such changes have accompanied – and often been prompted by – a broader 
transformation of politics and political culture (Boston et al. 1999). As a result, little 
established knowledge exists about how electoral systems shape the manner in which 
elected representatives define and carry out this important part of their role. 
 However, the ability of the EP to provide for the study of representatives 
within the same institution, but chosen under different electoral systems, provides the 
opportunity for an important advance in our understanding. This paper will therefore 
examine the attitudes and behaviours of MEPs with regard to the geographic area that 
they represent, and the individuals within it. It is common to refer to this feature of 
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representation as ‘constituency representation’. Given the fact that, apart from those 
cases such as Ireland that have adopted small regional ‘constituencies’ most EU 
member states have opted for national lists, it would be misleading to apply this term 
here. Instead, we prefer to refer to this as geographical representation (or 
representation of individual voters on the ground), as opposed to thematic or 
functional representation (which tends, on the whole, to privilege organised interests).  
What would constitute evidence of a strong degree of geographical or constituency 
focus among MEPs? 
 Once they have been elected MEPs can decide to give time to any of an almost 
infinite number of activities. But an MEP with a high degree of constituency focus 
should be expected, ceteris paribus, to spend significant amounts of time on political 
work in their domestic base, rather than concentrating solely or mainly on work inside 
the EP. We should also expect such MEPs to maintain an active political base (such as 
a well-resourced office) in their constituency/region; and to be in frequent contact 
with ordinary, individual citizens (in addition to the many organised groups and 
political actors that all MEPs will frequently interact with). Tables 1 to 3, 
respectively, display aggregate information from the 2006 MEP survey on the extent 
to which MEPs do, in fact, report spending substantial time on domestic political 
work, maintain a full-time office of their own within their constituency and other 
forms of voter contact, and are frequently in contact with ordinary citizens (with 
additional information, for the purposes of comparison, on the frequency of MEPs’ 
contact with other individuals and groups).  The task now is to consider whether 
electoral-institutional factors might help explain variance among MEPs on these 
measures. 
[Tables 1 – 3 about here] 
 
Electoral systems and representative behaviour 
Whereas study of the proportional consequences of electoral systems tends to 
lead to a concentration on the district magnitude and electoral formula characteristics 
of electoral systems, a shift of focus to the behavioural consequences of electoral 
systems requires us to pay attention to other features of electoral system design. The 
factors that previous scholars have drawn attention to in this regard are ballot 
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structure and, to a somewhat lesser extent, a particular aspect of district magnitude 
that is distinct from the aspects of M relevant to assessing proportionality. Taken 
together, these factors have been hypothesized to influence the behaviour (the ‘style’) 
of elected representatives. We deal with each of these characteristics in turn. 
From Douglas Rae (1967) onwards, scholars studying electoral systems have 
distinguished between categorical and ordinal ballot structures. The former allow for 
only a single, undifferentiated vote for either a party or candidate; the latter allows 
voters – to varying degrees – to influence which actual candidates get elected. This 
distinction is a logical way of separating different types of ballot structures, and –  
despite Rae’s own misgivings – has been shown to be a useful variable for explaining 
variation in the systemic proportionality of voting systems (Lijphart 1994a). However, 
the categorical/ordinal distinction is insufficiently nuanced to delineate the full range 
of variation in ballot structures. For instance, it lumps single member plurality (SMP) 
systems together with closed list systems: yet these two systems differ not only with 
regard to district magnitude, but also in terms of the apparent incentives they impose 
on representative behaviour (Katz 1980). Research suggests that representatives 
working under SMP systems are much more likely than those under closed list 
systems to feel the need to nurse a personal vote (e.g. Bowler and Farrell 1993); 
equally, voters under SMP systems are more likely to pay attention to the work of 
individual MPs. The categorical/ordinal distinction also treats those systems where 
voters vote for closed party lists as equivalent to systems where voters can vote only 
for one candidate from a party list. Both of these systems involve a categorical choice, 
but in the latter case there is a motivation for candidates to chase personal votes in the 
hope of leapfrogging over those candidates higher in the list and thus secure a seat (as, 
for instance, an adult movie star did so colourfully in the early 1980s in Italy). 
In addition to the categorical/ordinal distinction, another means of 
differentiating among types of ballot structure is whether the voting act is candidate-
based or party-based (Bowler and Farrell 1993). This relates to a key feature of 
electoral system variation, the extent to which the fate of individual candidates is 
determined by personal votes, or as Carey and Shugart put it (1995: 419), ‘the degree 
to which electoral systems reward politicians’ personal reputations’. Adding this 
additional dimension, one can produce a two-by-two typology of electoral systems 
based on electoral structure characteristics, which is summarized in Figure 1.  The 
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heavy grey arrow indicates the flow from ‘closed’ to ‘open’ electoral systems relating 
to the nature of the ballot structure design. As the system becomes more open, greater 
emphasis is placed on individual politicians, who in turn, it can be hypothesised, place 
greater emphasis on the representation of individual constituents and on personal vote 
chasing. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
But in addition to developing this more refined understanding of ballot structure, 
an adequate understanding of the possible influence of electoral system design on 
representative behaviour must also take into account the size of the region that is 
being represented. District magnitude, understood in this sense, has if anything 
featured even more prominently in previous research than has ballot structure (e.g. 
Cox 1997; Wessels 1999), and close analysis of representative roles has found 
evidence of significant differences based on size of region characteristics (Bowler and 
Farrell 1993; Cowley and Lochore 2000; Lancaster and Patterson 1990; Lundberg 
2002). 
There is a peculiarity of the electoral system used for electing Italian MEPs that 
is relevant here.  This relates to a disjuncture between the size of the district in terms 
of calculating the distribution of seats to parties (i.e. the ‘district magnitude’, or M) 
and the size of the district that the Italian MEPs are actually elected to (we shall refer 
to this as the ‘locus of representation’, or LoR). The standard measure of M is based 
on the level at which seats are allocated to the parties. In elections to Ireland’s 
national parliament, for example, seats are allocated to the parties in a given multi-
member constituency based on their votes in that constituency, and therefore the 
average M for, say, Ireland as a whole is based on the range across the various 
constituencies. By contrast, in Israel’s national elections, seat allocations are based on 
the parties’ national votes, and so there is just one M (= 120) for the entire country. In 
Italy’s European Parliament elections, however, this picture is somewhat complicated 
by the fact that while seats are allocated nationally (M = 87), the national vote 
proportions are based on aggregate party votes from each of Italy’s five regions 
(producing an average LoR of 17.4); and the seats are allocated to the parties’ 
candidates based on their rankings on the regional list and (crucially for our 
discussion) the personal votes received by the candidates in the region. So, while it is 
correct to talk of M=87 for the purposes of analysing aggregate proportionality in 
 9 
Italian European Parliament elections, in this specific case it would not be correct to 
use M as the basis for examining the effects of electoral system design on styles of 
parliamentary representation. 
To date, only limited systematic research has examined the impact of electoral 
systems on representative behaviour. Our established knowledge of constituency 
representation comes largely from research, mainly conducted in the US and British 
contexts, where electoral systems have been a constant, not a variable, factor. Much 
derives from the work of Richard Fenno (1978) on representatives’ ‘home styles’. 
Constituency representation, for Fenno, was not only something that representatives 
put a great deal of time and effort into; the manner and forms of that representation 
could tell scholars much about how representatives perceived their constituency and 
understood the representative relationship: 
[W]e cannot know all we need to know about House members in 
Washington unless we move out beyond the capitol city into the country and 
into its congressional districts.  Washington and home are different 
milieus… But they are not unconnected worlds.  The theory and practice of a 
representative form of government links them one to the other.  Though a 
congressman be immersed in one, he remains mindful of the other (Fenno 
1978: 214). 
Although clearly aware of possible links between ‘home-styles’ and 
representatives’ behaviour in the chamber, Fenno placed greater emphasis on the 
electoral implications of constituency representation (see also Kuklinksi 1979). The 
‘electoral connection’ angle on constituency representation was further developed by 
Cain et al. (1987). An important part of the stimulus for constituency service 
behaviour, they suggested, was the electoral benefits accruing to representatives in 
terms of a ‘personal vote’. British MPs and US Congressmen, operating under a single 
member plurality (SMP) system, appeared to be motivated in their constituency 
service activities to a high degree by strategic-electoral considerations of vote-
maximization. By making oneself known in a district, and particularly known as 
someone who worked hard for the interests of the district, both US representatives 
and, it was suggested, (although to a rather lesser degree) British MPs, could enhance 
their electoral prospects. 
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The implication was that under different electoral rules, different behaviour 
would follow from representatives, with constituency representation likely to be 
downgraded or to at least take different forms: ‘a polity’s electoral process, its policy 
processes, and the finer details of its institutional structure are bound together. If one 
changes the others adjust accordingly’ (Cain et al. 1987: 9). Consistent with this 
perspective, Bowler and Farrell’s (1993) study of MEPs argued that party list systems 
impose a need for those seeking re-election to orient their activities around the needs 
of a party leadership, and less of an incentive for non-partisan constituency service 
activities: ‘it is relatively easier for legislators to shirk in satisfying voter demands 
under some electoral systems than others’ (1993: 53). However, a cross-national 
collaborative research project in the 1980s reached the rather contrary conclusion that 
‘electoral systems are not fundamental in determining parliamentarian/constituency 
relationships…electoral systems are, perhaps, rather more passive elements…than 
either supporters or opponents of electoral reform tend to believe’ (Bogdanor 1985: 
299). 
In addition to a considerable body of literature exploring constituency 
representation further in the US context,3 other work conducted in the UK has 
reinforced the finding that constituency representation is increasingly central to the 
role of British MPs (e.g., Norton and Wood 1993).  Some doubt has, however, been 
cast on the degree to which this behaviour is motivated primarily by vote-winning 
considerations (Searing 1994), leading some scholars to term the growing 
constituency-related activity of most UK MPs ‘the puzzle of constituency service’ 
(Norris 1997). Indeed, the puzzle grows given the limited awareness of most MPs by 
their constituents (Crewe 1985; Weir and Beetham 1999: 70), while the work of 
Gaines (1998) has produced little support for the idea that growing levels of 
constituency service activity by MPs has led to an increased ‘incumbency advantage’. 
Other work conducted in Ireland, however, has found high levels of constituency 
activity by representatives, and a possible link to the candidate-centred electoral 
system operating there (Farrell 1985; Wood and Young 1997; though see Gallagher 
1987),4 while research in Australia, Canada and Germany has also found some 
                                               
3
  For a useful overview, see Smith (2003). 
4
  See also Chan (1988) on Korea and Hazan on Israel (1999). 
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suggestive evidence of the ‘personal vote’ phenomenon (Bean 1990; Ferejohn and 
Gaines 1991; Lancaster and Patterson 1990).5 
Finally, a very limited body of work has examined constituency representation 
in the context of the EP.  Bowler and Farrell (1993) used evidence from a mail survey 
of MEPs that indicated a strong empirical relationship between the electoral systems 
used in EU member states and aspects of MEPs’ constituency service behaviour.  
Where voting is linked to individual candidates rather than parties, such as in Britain 
with SMP (at the time of that survey) and Ireland with single transferable vote (STV), 
representatives placed greater emphasis on developing contacts with individual voters 
via constituency case-work, personal appearances, or maintaining a constituency 
office.  Those elected under PR-list concentrated more on building links with their 
party machinery and with large-scale organized interests.  However, this work was 
limited in that only a small range of behaviours was examined, not much attention 
was paid to individual-level variance, and (as acknowledged by the authors) they had 
little ability to control for factors like political culture (see below) that might offer 
alternative explanations of apparent electoral systems’ effects. Indeed, more recent 
evidence from the 1994 European Elections Study has led Katz to support the view 
that cultural factors are rather more important than strategic-electoral considerations 
promoted directly by an electoral system.  Katz therefore concludes that the stronger 
constituency emphasis among British MEPs compared to MEPs from other member 
states has little to do with electoral systems effects, but rather ‘is suggestive of a 
cultural effect’ (1997a: 218; also Katz 1999).  He therefore warns against predicting 
that electoral reform will generate a mechanistic response from representatives: 
‘“political culture” plays an important part in determining the political consequences 
of electoral systems; the same institutions may be associated with quite different 
outcomes if the actors pursue a different mix of objectives’ (1999a: 16). 
To summarize, we now have considerable knowledge about constituency 
service activity by representatives. However, scholars remain some way from 
achieving consensus on the factors that shape legislators’ understanding of their 
representative role and that promote greater levels and different forms of constituency 
                                               
5
  Bean’s evidence in favour of a personal vote in Australia is somewhat contradicted by 
the findings of Studlar and McAllister (1996) who find that local constituency service 
activity is actually negatively correlated with voting support for members of the 
House of Representatives. 
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service effort from elected representatives. At least three alternative sources of 
variance are clearly identifiable in extant work in this area: 
• Individual-level: individual differences in interpretation of the role of 
representative (e.g. Searing 1994), or in actual or perceived electoral 
vulnerability (Fenno 1978),6 are one likely source of variation in the 
quantity and form of constituency representation. 
• Electoral System: Broad differences following the strategic-electoral 
incentives created by an electoral system are a second likely source of 
variance identified (Cain et al. 1987; Bowler and Farrell 1993). 
• Cultural: General cultural differences across country or region in the 
expectations and demands placed upon elected representatives are a third 
source of variance identified (Katz 1997, 1999). 
 
Unfortunately, while previous work has been able to identify these different 
factors as plausible explanations of variation in constituency service activity, there has 
been little progress made in understanding when and to what extent each is important. 
This failure on the part of previous work has largely not been a function of sloppy or 
incomplete analysis of available data. Rather, the problem has usually been the more 
fundamental (and intractable) one of limitations in research design.  For instance, 
while research in a single political system (e.g. Fenno 1978; Searing 1994; Norris 
1997) and even some comparative analysis (notably Cain et al. 1987) has been able to 
examine individual sources of variance in behaviour – such as electoral vulnerability, 
role choices, and so on – such work, however, is generally unable to explore strategic-
electoral or cultural influences, because such factors are largely if not wholly 
constant. Needless to say, cross-national work does open up the possibility of being 
able to explore cultural and electoral systems variables.  However, several factors 
have often been at play in limiting the conclusions drawn from cross-national 
comparisons: (a) cross-national work that compared members of different political 
institutions might be ignoring a further important source of variance – behavioural 
                                               
6
  Fenno observes of members of Congress that ‘their perception of a reelection 
constituency is fraught with uncertainty… House members see electoral uncertainty 
where outsiders would fail to unearth a single objective indicator of it’ (1978: 10-11. 
Emphasis added). 
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imperatives in some way imposed upon representatives by the institution itself;7 (b) 
much cross-national work (Bowler and Farrell 1993; Katz 1997a), in concentrating on 
the broader comparative perspective, has ended up paying only limited attention to 
individual differences; and (c) a fundamental problem has often existed in attempting 
to disentangle electoral-system effects from cultural ones.  Often, the two may appear 
largely coterminous in particular cases, particularly as in the long run an electoral 
system plausibly shapes the broader political culture of a country. 
Thus, despite the accumulation of work in this area, some key questions remain 
essentially unanswered. Is the constituency service phenomenon inherently bound-up 
in a broader political culture that defines the representative relationship in particular 
ways, or is such behaviour by politicians primarily driven by individual strategic 
considerations of maximising their own electoral prospects by seeking a ‘personal 
vote’? How, then, might the behaviour of representatives vary across different 
electoral systems and political cultures? And how does their broader interpretation of 
the representative role differ in response to such factors? These are questions that this 
paper explores within the context of the EP. Before we begin to do so, however, we 
must first explain how and why the EP provides a particularly appropriate research 
site for investigating these questions, despite it ostensibly being elected under 
‘uniform’ electoral procedures. 
 
The 2002 Legislation and the Notion of Electoral System 
‘Uniformity’ 
After a long, rather tortuous process of negotiation, in 2002 the EU finally 
managed to pass legislation establishing Uniform Electoral Procedures (UEPs) for 
elections to the European Parliament. By these were ‘uniform’ to a degree. More 
accurately they can be described as a set of parameters guiding national legislation on 
the design of electoral systems for the EP – parameters so general that they required 
                                               
7
  As Bowler and Farrell observe, ‘while legislators face electorally-imposed incentives, 
it is also the case that they face incentives imposed by the chambers in which they 
work…it is all too easy – especially when comparing across different nations – to 
forget factors which affect the behaviour of parliamentarians that are more related to 
the legislature in which they work’ (1993: 48-49). 
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no reform of existing EP electoral systems. The main provisions of the 2002 
legislation can be summarized quite clearly and simply:8 
• That EP elections shall be held under a proportional representation electoral 
system, using either a list system or the single transferable vote (STV); 
• That there is scope for member states to adopt some form of preferential 
voting, but this is not a requirement; 
• That member states shall be free to establish regional lists, providing that these 
do not affect the proportional nature of the voting system; 
• That a legal minimum threshold for representation of parties may be set, 
though it should not exceed 5 percent; 
• That subject to the provisions of the Act, there is scope for national legislation 
to take account of the specific situation of a member state, but this cannot 
affect the proportional nature of the electoral system. 
 
The legislation on UEPs, coming after many years of failed attempts, was 
undoubtedly significant in embedding a common set of principles by which all 
representatives would be elected to the EU’s democratic chamber. Nonetheless, the 
fact remains that the legislation encompasses considerable scope for member states to 
operate electoral systems that are far from identical. This scope was to a substantial 
extent utilised in June 2004 (Table 4). Examining the electoral arrangements deployed 
in the 25 member states (the Table comprises 26 cases, because of the internal 
differentiation in the UK between mainland Britain and Northern Ireland) we can 
detail differences across the systems according to three main features of electoral 
systems: the electoral formula, district magnitude and ballot structure. 
[Table 4 about here] 
In terms of electoral formula, two levels of difference can be observed. There is 
the obvious distinction between STV and list systems. But within the list systems we 
see a mixture of highest average (d’Hondt, Saine Laguë, modified Sainte Laguë), and 
                                               
8
  The following summary is based on a note from the General Secretariat of the 
Council of the EU on February 22, 2002 (6151/02 PE 14 INST 21). This memo 
anticipated the subsequent Assent of the EP in June 2002. 
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largest remainder (Hare, Droop) formulas. It is well established in the voluminous 
electoral systems literature (see summary in Farrell 2001: 156) that the choice of 
electoral formula can have important implications for the overall proportionality of 
the electoral system; in this regard, it is interesting to note how a plurality of member 
states (12 in all) have opted for the least proportional formula available, namely 
d’Hondt. 
As far as district magnitude is concerned, variation is less than in the past: since 
Britain’s shift to list PR in 1999, no state operates a single member constituency-
based system. The most pertinent distinction now in types of electoral system is that 
between regional and national systems. The 2002 UEP legislation refers to the 
possibility that member states might consider regionalizing their representation in the 
EP (i.e. through the use of regional list systems or STV).9 As we saw, this was stated 
more prescriptively in earlier drafts of the legislation – requiring larger states (those 
with more than 20 million citizens) to move in this direction, a provision that would 
have necessitated changes on the part of larger member states. But these proposals 
were watered down, in anticipation of likely national resistance; in 2004 France was 
the sole pre-accession member state to voluntarily ‘regionalise’ its system. 
As with electoral formulas, current district magnitudes vary substantially – 
something that can be seen with reference to both the direct measure of magnitude 
(M) and the measure of effective threshold (Teff; essentially the mirror image of M). 
The latter measure is included as it is intuitively easier to interpret, and it also 
facilitates easy comparison with legal thresholds wherever these are applied. The 
variations in Teff follow from three factors: 
• In part, they result from the small number of MEPs elected in some places 
(notably Luxembourg and Northern Ireland whose Teffs of 10.7 and 18.7 
respectively are very much on the high [i.e., disproportional] side); 
• They also result from some member states electing MEPs in geographical 
regions (resulting in higher than average Teffs in Britain, and Ireland);10 
                                               
9
  See the note from the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU on February 22, 
2002 (6151/02 PE 14 INST 21). 
10
  Note that France, which changed from national to regional list in 2004, adopted a 5 
percent legal threshold (at regional level) at the same time, which ironically was 
lower than the Teff (of 6.9) that would have been required for parties to win seats. Had 
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• Finally, they are also affected by the use of legal thresholds in 14 cases 
(Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Sweden), 
although bizarrely in six of these cases the legal threshold is actually set lower 
than the Teff (Belgium, France, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, and most 
dramatically of all, Cyprus). 
 
Apart from the mechanical effects of electoral systems on who is elected to 
parliament, there are also potentially important consequences of electoral systems for 
how representatives operate once elected – the principal focus of this paper. The third 
of our major electoral system features – ballot structure – could be expected to have 
an impact in both respects. Ballot structure is referred to in the new legislation, which 
states that member states ‘may authorise’ preferential voting. In earlier legislative 
drafts, the case was put more strongly in favour of requiring member states to move in 
this direction, but this was soon watered down once it was clear that most member 
states were not sympathetic. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Following the ballot structure typology set out in Figure 1, Figure 2 plots the 
main areas of variation in ballot structure design in the 2004 EP elections, showing 
three main forms of variation: ‘open’, ‘ordered’ and ‘closed’.  The open systems – in 
which the candidates’ electoral fates are affected by their personal vote-chasing 
activities – are used in nine cases, three of these recent EU entrants (Estonia, Malta 
and Lithuania11). At the other extreme, closed systems – in which candidates’ 
electoral fates are determined by their party list placement – are used in eight member 
                                                                                                                                       
the proposal in the original draft of the EP legislation requiring larger member states 
to adopt regional lists been implemented, this would have required changes by all the 
larger member states, including Germany (which permits a regional balance on the 
party lists, through the use of combined Land lists, an option that tends to be used by 
the CDU and CSU). The interesting case here is Italy, whose electoral system 
incorporates a national list calculation for determining seat allocation with a 5-region 
system for locating the MEPs. In terms of measuring overall proportionality, 
therefore, the Teff is a very low 0.9; however, this masks the fact that the MEPs are 
regionally anchored. 
11
  Lithuanian parties are free to opt for either open or closed list design.  With the 
exception of the Labour Party, all the other parties opted for open lists (information 
supplied by Ingrida Unikaite). 
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states. Finally, there are ordered list systems, in which there is some, limited scope for 
candidates to improve their list placement through personal votes. These are used in 
nine member states, five of which joined in the most recent accession (for more 
discussion on ballot structure design, see, inter alia, Shugart 2005). 
In most cases the ordered list system takes account of party votes as well as 
personal votes, and therefore it is rare for a low-placed candidate to accumulate 
sufficient personal votes to move high enough up the rankings to get into a winnable 
position.12 Denmark stands out in this regard, because under its electoral law, the 
parties are able to decide whether to use party votes to top up the personal votes of the 
candidates at the top of the list (as happens, for instance, in Belgium and the 
Netherlands), or to allocate seats to candidates according to the number of personal 
votes each receives (in essence, what happens in Finland).13 In the past, the Danish 
Socialist People’s Party tended to take the first option, but in recent elections it has 
fallen in line with all the other parties in opting for what is in essence the open list 
version (albeit one where the very act of parties putting up ordered lists still connotes 
an advantage for those candidates ranked higher on the ballot paper). Given its 
similarity with the Finnish system, we have located Denmark (and Estonia) in the 
cluster of ‘open systems’. Similarly, since candidates’ personal votes matter greatly in 
Irish, Maltese, Italian, Luxembourg and Lithuanian elections, we also include them on 
the ‘open’ cluster (see also Bardi 1987). Our working hypothesis is that we should 
expect to find significant differences in ‘geographical representation’ by MEPs 
depending on which of the three electoral system clusters they were elected under, 
with the relationship being broadly linear – from higher levels of such representation 
under open systems, through more modest levels under ordered systems, and lower 
still in closed systems. 
The second important dimension for analysing potential electoral systems 
effects on representative roles is District Magnitude – the size of the area they are 
                                               
12
  The proportions of personal votes that candidates need to leapfrog up the list and 
secure a seat vary from one case to the next. This is usually determined by 
straightforward percentile thresholds, such as: Australia, 7 percent; Czech Republic, 5 
percent; Netherlands, 10 percent; and Sweden, 5 percent. In Belgium, however, the 
threshold amounts to a d’Hondt quota of the party vote. 
13
  Lithuania also allows its parties to opt for open or closed lists, and all bar the Labour 
party have opted for open lists. 
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representing. Any individual voter-orientation promoted by a more open ballot 
structure might be limited in the case of national list systems (which inevitably require 
a large district magnitude). For this reason, earlier studies have tended to place great 
stress on district magnitude; indeed, if anything this has featured even more 
prominently in previous research then has ballot structure (e.g. Cox 1997; Wessels 
1999), and close analysis of representative roles has found evidence of significant 
differences based on district magnitude (M) or size of region characteristics (Bowler 
and Farrell 1993; Cowley and Lochore 2000; Lancaster and Patterson 1990; Lundberg 
2002). 
In their theoretical modelling of electoral system effects on incentives for 
politicians to cultivate a personal vote, Carey and Shugart propose a modification of 
the relationship between M and MPs’ personal vote-chasing activities, based on the 
degree of openness of the ballot structure: their central idea is that a non-linear 
relationship is likely to operate, with a representative’s ‘personal reputation’ being 
worth less and less as M rises in closed systems, but more and more in open systems 
(1995: 431). This suggests a lower emphasis on ‘constituency service’ activities in the 
closed/national list cases, but also implies the need for an interactive term in 
multivariate analysis that combines M with electoral system type. In the analysis that 
follows we therefore include variables for ballot structure (closed, ordered, open) and 
district magnitude (variations in M) separately and in combined interaction terms. But 
in order to provide an additional test of how these variables, operating in conjunction 
with each other, may interact with politicians’ representative roles, we also take 
account of recent work by Shugart (Shugart 2001; Carey and Shugart 1995) to 
develop an index of ‘intra-party efficiency’. This index takes account of ballot 
structure and district magnitude variations to categorize the EP’s electoral systems in 
terms of a single measure. The index is based on three main characteristics that 
Shugart terms Ballot, Vote and District, in which higher scores across these 
components are indicative of a candidate-centred ordinal system and lower scores of a 
party-centred categorical system (see also Farrell and McAllister 2006: ch. 7). 
The Ballot component measures the degree of party versus voter control over the 
ballot placement of candidates. This characteristic incorporates features of electoral 
system design as well as parties’ candidate selection rules. The rationale here is that 
 19 
the lower the extent of party control, the greater the potential incentive for candidates 
to develop personal reputation. The coding is as follows: 
1 Ballot access dominated by parties, and voters may not disturb order of list; 
2 Ballot access dominated by parties, but voters may disturb list; 
3 Ballot access nearly unrestricted. 
The Vote component distinguishes between systems that require voters to vote 
for party lists or candidates (a nominal vote).  Following Farrell and McAllister 
(2006), our coding of this component differs from Shugart’s with regard to where to 
locate single transferable vote and open list systems.  Accordingly, our adapted Vote 
coding is as follows: 
1 Vote for list only; 
2 Vote is list or nominal, but list votes predominate; 
3 Vote is nominal or list, but nominal votes predominate and pool to other 
candidates; 
4 Vote is nominal only, but vote may pool or transfer to other candidates. 
Finally, the District component takes account of the potential effect of district 
magnitude, and the likelihood that this can vary depending on the nature of the ballot 
structure. In systems where voters cast party-based votes, they find that the personal 
reputation of the candidate declines in significance as district magnitude rises, 
whereas in systems characterised by candidate-based (nominal) votes, as district 
magnitude rises and candidates face more inter- and intra-party competitors, the 
incentives for personal vote chasing increases. This characteristic is coded as follows: 
1 District magnitude is greater than one, with Vote<3; 
2 District magnitude is greater than one, with Vote>2, provided that Ballot>1. 
Using this coding scheme, we categorise the 26 electoral systems for EP 
elections as shown in Table 5. We include this modified Shugart index, along with the 
other electoral system variables indicated above, in the multivariate analysis that 
follows. 
[Table 5 about here] 
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As the discussion in this section has demonstrated, the provisions of the 2002 
UEP legislation left significant scope for variation in the electoral systems used by EU 
member states for EP elections. Furthermore, across all three dimensions of electoral 
system discussed – electoral formula, district magnitude and ballot structure – 
substantial variation was indeed experienced.  
 
Analysing Electoral System Effects on MEPs’ Representative 
Behaviour 
As indicated above, there are multiple observable implications of geographical 
representation among MEPs for which we have available survey evidence. We do not 
propose to try to isolate one or two of these observable implications as the most 
important and examine only them; rather, we have chosen to run a parallel series of 
explanatory multivariate models on numerous dependent variables, and to then 
examine the overall patterns emerging from these multiple indicators. 
 The electoral system-related variables included in the analysis are specified as 
follows. First, we include two sets of variables for ballot structure differences: (1) our 
dichotomous ‘STV/list’ measure (coded ‘1’ for an MEP elected under STV, ‘0’ 
otherwise); (2) our more nuanced ballot structure variable (based on Figure 2), which 
we have coded as two dummies: ‘1’ for those elected under open and ordered systems, 
‘0’ otherwise, with MEPs elected under closed systems serving as the comparator 
category. Second, we include a variable for the average district magnitude for each 
our cases.14 Third, to allow for the possibility that there is an important inter-
relationship between ballot structure and district magnitude, we include two 
interaction terms, where our measure of M is combined with our main (nuanced) 
ballot structure variable. Fourth, we also specify a variable for our modified Shugart 
index, coded in the manner indicated previously. And finally, we include a dummy 
variable for MEPs from Britain – to capture the possibility that there might be a 
                                               
14
  For all the analyses reported, we did also try running the models with the measure of 
district magnitude specified as the natural log of M, rather than M itself.  However, 
this made no substantive difference to any of the important findings, and tended to 
lower the model fit. We have therefore reported the analyses conducted using M, 
rather than the logged form. 
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persisting culture of constituency representation here that is not present in many of the 
other member states operating closed electoral systems for EP elections. 
 For each dependent variable, we specify three versions of the multivariate 
model. The first includes only our basic measures of STV/list, ballot structure and 
district magnitude, plus the dummy variable for British MEPs. The second model 
includes all of these variables, plus our modified Shugart index. The final model omits 
the Shugart index but includes the interaction terms combining ballot structure with 
district magnitude. These models are specified for eight different dependent variables. 
Three of the dependent variables are concerned with campaigning activities: the 
amount of time an MEP reports having put into campaigning, and the amount of effort 
they placed on telephone and door-to-door canvassing. Two further dependent 
variables are concerned with MEPs’ attitudes to the representation of individual 
constituents. The final three dependent variables concern their reported behaviours 
once in office: the amount of time that they spend on political work at home, and 
whether or not their have an individual office of their own, and whether or not they 
conduct personal consultation sessions for individual voters. OLS regression estimates 
for the explanatory models applied to these several dependent variables are reported 
in the multiple panels of Table 6. 
[Table 6 about here] 
The general expectations concerning relationships between our independent 
variables and the various dependent variables specified should by now be clear. If 
more open electoral systems do promote greater geographical representation and a 
more active effort by MEPs to project an individual presence, we should observe such 
patterns in the results presented in Table 6. Thus, we should expect MEPs from more 
open systems to campaign more vigorously in elections, and particularly to engage in 
those types of campaigning that connect then to individual voters. We should also 
expect them to accord greater importance to representing individual constituents, and 
to spend more time and effort on domestic political work and in upholding their 
regional presence. If such patterns do generally prevail, then their manifestation in our 
respective independent variables may be somewhat complex, due both to the close 
inter-relationships between some of our predictor variables (notably between that for 
our two main ballot structure variables) and because the specification of interaction 
terms can complicate the interpretation of the original ‘main effects’ variables (Black 
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1999: 488-513). But the broad understanding of the hypothesized relationship is 
apparent. 
 The various models for which results are presented show a generally modest 
‘fit’: electoral system effects do not come anywhere close to wholly accounting for 
MEPs’ attitudes and behaviour – nor would we have expected them to. Nonetheless, 
there are interesting and important results for some of our electoral system variables. 
 Panel A shows that the only variable having a consistent impact on the amount 
of election campaigning conducted is the national dummy for British MEPs – the sign 
of the coefficient indicating them to have campaigned harder than most of their 
counterparts from other member states – although the coefficients for ordered systems 
(both the main effects coefficient and the interaction) are also modestly significant in 
our third model. But we see, as suggested above, much stronger effects when we look 
at the type of election campaigning conducted. Efforts to connect with individual 
voters, via telephone and doorstep canvassing, are strongly predicted not only by the 
dummy variable for British MEPs, but also by the STV/list variable (with those 
elected under STV much more likely to engage in such activities), and by the more 
nuanced ballot structure variable and district magnitude once these latter two factors 
are specified together in an interaction term. More open electoral systems are 
associated with greater personal campaigning, in particular for MEPs representing 
larger regions. 
 Our two dependent variables on MEPs’ attitudes towards representing their 
constituents produce rather inconsistent findings. The model for ‘representing all 
people in the constituency/region’ has a very poor model fit with only the British 
dummy variable emerging with a (weakly) significant coefficient. However, when we 
examine attitudes on the ‘importance of representing citizens’ individual interests’ we 
find not only a strong positive coefficient for British MEPs, but also a similarly strong 
effect for the STV/list variable in our simple model, and a somewhat weaker effect for 
our general measure of ‘open’ systems in our fuller model, with those elected under 
STV/Open systems again according greater importance to this aspect of 
representation. 
 When we examine our final three dependent variables, which are all concerned 
with MEPs’ representative behaviour, we find only modest model fits. Nonetheless, 
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on each occasion electoral system variables still emerge as significant predictors in all 
three cases. Our models for ‘time spent on political work in an MEP’s home country’ 
produce positive and significant coefficients not only for the British dummy variable, 
but also in two of the three models for STV/list (again those elected under STV giving 
more time to domestic political work) and in our first, simple model for open and 
ordered electoral systems. Our model for whether an MEP maintains a full-time office 
again produces a positive coefficient for British MEPs, but also, in our simplest 
model, for STV/list and in our final model (once the interaction terms are included) 
for open and ordered systems: suggesting that MEPs from such systems are more 
likely to maintain offices, particularly in smaller district magnitudes. Our model for 
the ‘conduct of consultations with individual voters’ also produces a somewhat 
complex pattern of coefficients, but one indicating that such behaviour is engaged in 
most by MEPs from open (and ordered) systems, and particularly when they operate 
in smaller district magnitudes. 
 Overall, our findings do not suggest that electoral system-related factors are 
all-important for shaping the attitudes and behaviours of MEPs with regard to 
constituency representation. Electoral system factors do not, for instance, explain the 
persistence of the ‘British effect’ that we have observed in nearly all of our 
multivariate models. But there are electoral system effects, and they tend to be very 
much in the direction hypothesized. MEPs elected under more open electoral systems, 
and particularly STV, are more likely to engage in personal election campaigning, to 
accord importance to representing individual constituents, and to engage in post-
election activities that maintain and build their presence among those voters who may 
shape their re-election prospects. 
  
Conclusion 
 In this paper we have explored evidence as to whether electoral system-related 
factors shape geographical representation in the European Parliament. We began by 
considering the numerous possible observable implications of greater or lesser 
concern with this dimension of representation. We also spent some time assessing 
how electoral system differences might be specified for our empirical analysis. 
Finally, we conducted multivariate analyses which showed that, while the relationship 
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is not a particularly simple or wholly consistent one, there is a general empirical link 
between the systems under which MEPs are elected and their orientation towards 
constituency representation. More ‘open’ systems are associated with a greater 
constituency focus by elected representatives. 
There remain some important factors that our analysis has not adequately 
explained. One of these is the persistent distinctiveness of British MEPs – elected 
under a closed list system, yet tending to accord a high priority to geographical 
representation. But as we show elsewhere in our wider study, even this has responded 
to the changed electoral arrangements introduced in the UK in 1999.  
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Most of my time each week 9.3 
Some of my time each week 48.1 
Limited time, mostly at weekend 33.2 
Little or no time 2.8 
Varies too much to say 6.5 
 
N = 214 
 
 
Note: The question asked was: ‘How much time do you spend on political work in 
your home country rather than work at the European Parliament?’ 
 
Source: 2006 MEP Survey 
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Access via a permanently staffed office of my 
own 
86.0 
Access via a permanently staffed office shared 
with other MEPs 
8.4 




N = 214 
 
 
Note: The question asked was: ‘Which of the following forms of contact with 
individual voters do you have?’ 
 
Source: 2006 MEP Survey 
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Table 3: MEP Contacts with Organised Groups and Individuals (%) 
 





















73.1 21.7 3.8 0.9 0.5 212 
Organised 
groups 
52.1 42.2 12.8 1.9 0.9 211 
Lobbyists 40.3 32.3 16.4 5.0 6.0 201 
Journalists 55.5 38.8 4.8 0.5 0.5 209 
National Party 
Members 
57.0 36.2 4.3 0.5 2.0 207 
National Party 
Executive 
36.1 37.0 18.3 4.3 4.3 208 
National MPs 23.8 48.1 20.0 3.3 4.8 210 
National 
Ministers 
9.5 31.4 30.5 14.8 13.8 210 
 
Note: The question asked was: ‘How frequently are you in contact with the following 
groups, people or institutions?’ 
 




Table 4: The European Parliament’s Electoral Systems, 2004 
 No. 
MEPs 
Electoral formula Ballot structure No. of 
districts 
Mean M Eff thres (Teff)a 
       
Austria  18 d’Hondt Orderedb; single vote  1 18  4.0 (3.9) 
Belgium  24 d’Hondt Ordered; multi-votec  3 8.0  5.0 (8.3*) 
Britain  75 d’Hondt Closed; single vote  11 6.8  9.6* 
Cyprus  6 Hare Ordered; multi-vote  1 6  1.8 (10.7) 
Czech Rep.  24 d’Hondt Ordered; multi-vote  1 24  5.0 (3.0) 
Denmark  14 d’Hondt Open; single vote  1 14  5.0 
Estonia  6 d’Hondt Open; single vote  1 6  10.7 
Finland  14 d’Hondt Open; single vote  1 14  5.0 
France  78 Hare/d’Hondt Closed; single votec  8 9.8  5.0*d (6.9) 
Germany  99 Hare-Niemeyer Closed; single vote  1 e 99  5.0 (0.7) 
Greece  24 Largest remainder-Droop Closed; single vote  1 24  3.0 (3.0) 
Hungary  24 d’Hondt Closed; single vote  1 24  5.0 (3.0) 
Ireland  13 STV-Droop Open; multi-vote  4 3.3  17.4* 
Italy  78 Hare Open; multi-votec  1 f 78  0.9 
Latvia  9 St. Laguë Ordered; multi-vote  1 9  5.0 (7.5) 
Lithuania  13 Hare Open; multi-voteg  1 13  5.0 (5.3) 
Luxembourg  6 d’Hondt Open; multi vote  1 6  10.7 
Malta  5 STV-Droop Open; multi vote  1 5  12.5 
Netherlands  27 Hare/d’Hondt Ordered; single vote  1 27  2.6 
N. Ireland  3 STV-Droop Open; multi vote  1 3  18.7 
Poland  54 d’Hondth Closed; single vote  1 h 54  5.0 (1.3) 
Portugal  24 d’Hondt Closed; single vote  1 24  3.0 
Slovak Rep.  14 Largest remainder-Droop Ordered; single vote  1 14  5.0 (5.0) 
Slovenia  7 d’Hondt Ordered; single vote  1 7  4.0 (9.3) 
Spain  54 d’Hondt Closed; single vote  1 54  1.3 




 a Effective Threshold: Teff = 75%/(M + 1). Effectively a mirror image of M, the lower the Teff, the more proportional the system. Because it is seen as an approximation, 
Teff is recorded to just one decimal point (* indicates those cases where it is based on a national average). In those cases where there is a legal threshold – which is 
usually (the exceptions are underlined) greater than Teff – the legal threshold is reported (and Teff is provided, for the sake of record, in brackets). 
 b In ordered list systems, the rules vary regarding the proportion of ‘personal votes’ a candidate requires in order to win a seat regardless of where s/he is ranked.  
Information is patchy, but the rules we are aware of are as follows: Austria, 7%; Belgium, d’Hondt quota of the party vote; Czech Republic 5%; Netherlands, 10%; 
Sweden 5%. 
 c Multi-vote implies that voters can express a vote/preference for more than one candidate. Gender equality law applies requiring the parties to balance their lists. 
 d 5% in the region. 
 e Parties can balance lists to ensure a fair regional representation. This option tends to be used by CDU and CSU. 
 f In this table, Italy is treated as having one national constituency (mean M = 78) reflecting the fact that the seat allocation is based on national votes. However, for the 
purpose of examining MEPs’ representative roles, it should be noted that Italy is divided into five regions (mean M = 15.6).  
 g Parties can opt to have closed lists, an option used by the Labour Party.  All other parties operated open lists. 
 h Available sources are unclear, but it seems that the seats are allocated nationally using d’Hondt and are then filled within each of the 13 regions (using Hare-
Niemeyer). 
 
Source: Various. In particular: www.elections2004.eu.int; www.electionsineurope.org; www.MEPs.org.uk; http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/; Lodge (2005); Maier and 
Tenscher (2006);information supplied by Allan Sikk, Philip Stöver, Ingrida Unikaite, and Andreas Wüst. 
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Description of system Cases Number of Cases in 
2006 MEP Survey 
     
 9 3, 4, 2 STV Ireland, N. Ireland, Malta 7 
 8 2, 4, 2 Quasi-list Finland 5 
 7 2, 3, 2 Open list, panachage Denmark, Estonia, Italy, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg 
56 
 5 2, 2, 1 Ordered list Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 




 3 1, 1, 1 Closed list Britain, France, Germany, 





 Table 6: Regression Estimates (standard errors) for Eight Dependent Variables 
 









STV/list .47 (.37) .81 (.90) .91 (.56) 
Open System .06 (.20) .80 (1.81) - .60 (.60) 
Ordered System - .24 (.19) .13 (.89) - .85 (.34)** 
District Magnitude .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 
British .51 (.23)** .51 (.23)** .456 (.23)** 
Modified Shugart Index  - .18 (.44)  
Open * M Interaction   .04 (.04) 
Ordered * M Interaction 
 
  .04 (.02)** 
(Constant) 4.47 (.18) 5.02 (1.32) 4.53 (.18) 
Adjusted R2 =  







* < .10; ** < .05; *** < .01    
 









STV/list .356 (.42) - .01 (.95) 1.45 (.61)** 
Open System .13 (.22) - .65 (1.90) -1.33 (.64)** 
Ordered System - .36 (.20)* - .74 (.93) - .48 (.37) 
District Magnitude - .01 (.00)** - .01 (.00)** - .01 (.00)*** 
British .88 (.25)*** .88 (.25)*** .85 (.24)*** 
Modified Shugart Index  .19 (.46)  
Open * M Interaction   .10 (.04)** 
Ordered * M Interaction 
 
  .01 (.02) 
(Constant) 2.21 (.19) 1.64 (1.38) 2.25 (.19) 
Adjusted R2 =  







* < .10; ** < .05; *** < .01    
 









STV/list 1.58 (.42)*** 4.40 (.98)*** 2.54 (.63)*** 
Open System - .54 (.23)** 5.67 (1.98)*** -1.86 (.67)*** 
Ordered System - .98 (.21)*** 2.03 (.98)** -1.19 (.40)*** 
District Magnitude - .01 (.00)*** - .01 (.00)*** - .01 (.00)*** 
British .36 (.26) .36 (.26)** .33 (.26) 
Modified Shugart Index  -1.51 (.48)***  
Open * M Interaction   .09 (.04)** 
Ordered * M Interaction 
 
  .01 (.02) 
(Constant) 3.00 (.20) 7.51 (1.45) 3.04 (.21) 
Adjusted R2 =  







* < .10; ** < .05; *** < .01    
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STV/list .57 (.44) .74 (1.00) .11 (.65) 
Open System - .01 (.23) .36 (2.00) .62 (.68) 
Ordered System - .17 (.22) .01 (.99) - .16 (.38) 
District Magnitude .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 
British .49 (.26)* .49 (.26)* .50 (.26)* 
Modified Shugart Index  - .09 (.48)  
Open * M Interaction   - .04 (.04) 
Ordered * M Interaction 
 
  .00 (.02) 
(Constant) 4.26 (.20) 4.53 (1.46) 4.25 (.20) 
Adjusted R2 =  







* < .10; ** < .05; *** < .01    
 
 









STV/list 2.26 (.60)*** 1.46 (1.27) 1.20 (.83) 
Open System  .14 (.29) -1.64 (2.50) 1.58 (.85)* 
Ordered System .21 (.26) - .64 (1.23) .22 (.47) 
District Magnitude .01 (.00)** .01 (.00)** .01 (.00)** 
British 1.33 (.32)*** 1.33 (.32)*** 1.36 (.32)*** 
Modified Shugart Index  .43 (.60)  
Open * M Interaction   - .10 (.06)* 
Ordered * M Interaction 
 
  .00 (.02) 
(Constant) 2.57 (.25) 1.29 (1.82) 2.55 (.25) 
Adjusted R2 =  







* < .10; ** < .05; *** < .01    
 
 









STV/list .60 (.30)** .57 (.75) 1.00 (.47)** 
Open System .23 (.16) .17 (1.50) - .31 (.50) 
Ordered System .29 (.15)* .26 (.74) .28 (.26) 
District Magnitude .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 
British .30 (.18)* .30 (.18)* .29 (.18) 
Modified Shugart Index  .02 (.37)  
Open * M Interaction   .04 (.00) 
Ordered * M Interaction 
 
  .00 (.01) 
(Constant) 2.50 (.14) 2.45 (1.09) 2.51 (.14) 
Adjusted R2 =  







* < .10; ** < .05; *** < .01    
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STV/list .36 (.20)* - .25 (.48) .13 (.29) 
Open System .08 (.09) -1.23 (.94) .38 (.29) 
Ordered System .15 (.08)* - .49 (.47) .26 (.15)* 
District Magnitude .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 
British .28 (.10)*** .28 (.10)*** .29 (.10)*** 
Modified Shugart Index  .32 (.23)  
Open * M Interaction   - .02 (.02) 
Ordered * M Interaction 
 
  - .01 (.01) 
(Constant) .42 (.07) - .54 (.70) .41 (.07) 
Adjusted R2 =  







* < .10; ** < .05; *** < .01    
 
 









STV/list .24 (.19) -1.13 (.47)** - .14 (.28) 
Open System .06 (.08) -2.87 (.92)*** .58 (.28)** 
Ordered System .16 (.08)* -1.28 (.45)*** .34 (.15)** 
District Magnitude .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .02 (.01)* 
British .11 (.10) .11 (.09) .13 (.10) 
Modified Shugart Index  .72 (.22)***  
Open * M Interaction   - .03 (.02)* 
Ordered * M Interaction 
 
  - .01 (.01) 
(Constant) .27 (.07) -1.88 (.67) .25 (.07) 
Adjusted R2 =  































Figure 2: Variations in the Ballot Structures used for European Parliament 
















Open list; single vote: 
Finland 
Ordered list; single candidate 
vote matters: Denmark, Estonia 
STV with candidate ranking: 
Ireland, N. Ireland, Malta 
Ordered list; multi- candidate 
vote matters: Italy, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg 
Ordered list; single candidate 
vote option doesn’t matter: 
Austria, Netherlands, Slovenia, 
Slovak Rep., Sweden 
Ordered list; multi-candidate 
vote option doesn’t matter: 
Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Rep., 
Latvia 
Closed list: Britain, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, 












As for Table 1. 
